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 Most of the research on microfinance focuses on the microloan activities of microfinance 
institutions such as Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and Banco Sol of South America. These 
institutions make small loans to the poor to help them engage in income generating activities. 
Many organizations have tried to translate this practice to the United States, but due to 
fundamental differences between the advanced U.S. business environment and that found in the 
developing world, such attempts have been met with limited success. There is a substantial 
amount of research on microfinance institutions and activities in the U.S., however almost all of 
the activity is focused on making microloans. In this paper, a new method for pursuing 
microfinance, microequity, is put forward as a potential candidate for successfully and 
sustainably implementing microfinance in the United States. The preliminary conclusions 
reached in this paper, based on research into traditional microfinance internationally and in the 
U.S. as well as research on the pros and cons of traditional equity and debt financing, show that a 
microequity model for microfinance could offer a solution to the difficulties that have prevented 
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 Startups and other small businesses usually require some form of financing to initiate or 
sustain operations. However, many entrepreneurs are unable to access traditional forms of formal 
financing for various reasons. Traditionally, in the context of small businesses, formal financing 
has been defined as commercial banks and similar financial systems, government loans, equity 
investments, and any other type of financing which relies on the state to enforce contractual legal 
obligations (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2010). Often times the amounts of 
capital that are required by small or startup businesses are below the threshold of what 
commercial banks and other similar financial institutions are willing to provide (Pollinger, 
Outhwaite, & Cordero-Guzmán, 2007). Also, many times would be entrepreneurs may be 
deemed to not be credit worthy by formal financial institutions.  
 Microfinance emerged in the recent past as a way to provide small loans to entrepreneurs 
and circumvent the above difficulties. The microfinance model has been successful in the 
developing world, but, due to various factors, in the U.S. there have been problems with and 
questions about its sustainability and effectiveness (Pollinger et al., 2007).  
For small businesses, utilizing debt financing is very risky because most small, new 
businesses are likely to have low expected cash flows. It could be advantageous for these 
businesses to utilize equity financing rather than debt. First, equity investments provide 
insurance against becoming insolvent since the equity investor receives no return if the business 
struggles, as opposed to debt financing where loans have to be repaid regardless. Second, equity 
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investors such as venture capitalists and angel investors frequently add value to the business they 
invest in and many times help the business succeed. 
In this paper I will seek to answer the question of whether a different model for providing 
small amounts of capital, microequity, which uses equity rather than debt, may offer a solution to 
the problems faced in implementing microfinance in the United States.  
With the recent passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act by the U.S. 
Congress, it seems that a substantial new source of previously untapped equity funding may now 
be available to small business startups via the Act’s crowdfunding provisions. This new Act is 
certain to have major ramifications on microequity based financing.  
Microfinance Overview 
  For many years, the demand for small loans and credit has been fulfilled by informal 
financing arrangements, which are defined as “small, unsecured, short-term loans restricted to 
rural areas, agricultural contracts, households, individuals, or small entrepreneurial ventures” 
(Ayyagari et al., 2010). Typical examples of these types of arrangements include pawnshops, 
moneylenders, borrowing from family and friends, and ROSCAs (What is Microcredit?, 2011). 
ROSCA, which stands for rotating savings and credit association, are community based 
organizations where the members meet on a regular basis to contribute small sums to a funding 
pool, which is then given to a different member at each meeting on a rotating basis (Armendariz 
& Morduch, 2005). These sources of financing have undoubtedly been utilized by entrepreneurs 
to create income generating activities, however; problems exist with these types of financing. 
ROSCAs are constrained in two important ways. First, the size of the pool and the regular 
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payments are inflexible during the life of a given ROSCA. Second, while ROSCAs mobilize 
locally held funds, they do not provide a way to access funds from outside a given community 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2005).  
While moneylenders and pawnshops can also be considered as sources of microfinance, 
credit obtained from these types of sources is often very expensive for the borrower due to the 
high interest rates charged which are well above those found in the formal financial sector. 
Another source of microfinance can be family and friends. However, when borrowing from 
family and friends, interest costs may be low or in fact zero, but social costs and obligations can 
be considerable. For example, borrowing mom’s entire rainy day fund is likely to entail a very 
hands-on loan monitoring process, and borrowing from a close friend could destroy a cherished 
relationship in the event of a default.   
 The formal financial sector faces several obstacles when trying to serve the small credit 
market. These include asymmetry of information, multiple sources of risk, and the high cost of 
servicing small loans (Khavul, 2010). Asymmetry of information refers to the fact that in the 
instant case, a bank or similar financial institution will usually have no information on who is a 
good risk and who is not, because of the fact that potential small credit customers are likely to 
have little to no credit history. The multiple sources of risk are the ex-ante moral hazard problem 
of poor project selection and the ex-post moral hazard of non-repayment. In other words, before 
the loan is received there will be a tendency for an entrepreneur to choose a project that may be 
less than optimal, since they are risking the financial institutions capital and not their own. For 
small loans the problem is magnified because financial institutions cannot charge higher rates to 
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cover this risk, due to usury law. Then, after the loan is received, there is always the risk that the 
loan will default for various reasons other than poor project selection. In such cases borrowers 
may not be as motivated to work through difficulties since they have not invested their own 
money. Again the financial institutions have trouble pricing in this risk while staying under the 
usury ceiling. Servicing costs for small loans are high because fixed costs are a significant 
portion of the loan amount, limiting the economies of scale. Due to these factors, formal 
financial institutions have generally avoided the small credit market altogether, likely due to the 
perception that because of the aforementioned reasons there is no money to be made on these 
types of loans.  
 The difficulties faced by entrepreneurs in accessing small loans and credit led to 
the development of the modern microfinance movement, widely accepted to have begun with 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in the late 1970’s. Grameen Bank was founded by Dr. Muhammad 
Yunus in 1976, and was based on a model featuring what is called Grameencredit. The model is 
distinguished by: a mission to help the poor overcome poverty by creating income generating 
activities, not being based on any collateral or legal system but based on trust instead, borrowers 
must join groups in order to obtain loans, and the loans must be paid back in installments (What 
is Microcredit?, 2011). Since the inception of Grameen Bank, the model has been replicated 
throughout the developing world, with adaptations, in many instances, but mostly converging to 
the most salient features of the Grameen model.  A typical microfinance institution (MFI) in the 
global context is a non-profit organization funded by governmental and philanthropic sources. 
Some are also member owned co-ops. Funding comes from patient and undemanding capital as 
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opposed to demanding capital which seeks a return. MFIs have evolved from grant-dependent, 
loan only institutions to include many different forms. Some MFIs offer a variety of financial 
services such as banking, insurance, loans, etc. and some are profit seeking institutions (Chandra 
& Arun, 2011). 
The microfinance movement in the United States emerged in the mid-1980s. It was 
influenced by the growth and development of the international microfinance industry, and was a 
response to the need for better economic options for those entrepreneurs who lack access to 
formal financing. In particular the movement focused on those classes of people who have been 
traditionally categorized as disadvantaged: women, racial and ethnic minorities, and public 
assistance recipients (cited in Servon 2006; Hoy, Romero, & Zeuli, 2012). In the U.S. context 
there is a further focus on what are known as microenterprises, which are defined as those 
businesses with five or fewer employees that require $35,000 or less in start-up capital 
(Edgcomb & Klein, 2005). According to the U.S. Census (2012), in 2010 there were 4,078,084 
businesses with 1 to 4 employees out of a total of 7,396,628 businesses in all, showing that 
approximately 55% of all businesses could fit into the microenterprise category. Furthermore, 
these microenterprises had a combined total payroll of over $290 billion out of a total of $4.94 
trillion for all businesses, giving microenterprises approximately 17% of the entire U.S. payroll. 
These figures show that microenterprises are a significant part of the U.S. Economy. 
Although MFIs in the developing world were originally funded by governments and 
charitable organizations, an increasing number of these MFIs have made the transition to profit 
seeking institutions funded by commercial capital (Chandra & Arun, 2011). In contrast, most 
6 
 
MFIs in the U.S. are not self-sufficient and rely on grants, subsidies, and donations to cover their 
costs (Gollakota & Doshi, 2010). The reasons MFIs in the U.S. have had difficulty making this 
transition is twofold. First, the regulation of interest rates by the federal and state government(s) 
presents an obstacle. In order to make a profit, a lender must make a sum of interest on loans 
which is greater than the sum of the costs of operating, defaults, and inflation. For small loans 
this is difficult because fixed costs can be a significant portion of the principle amount. An 
interest rate of 30% has been suggested as sufficient to meet this threshold but this would 
conflict with usury law (Bell, 2010). According to Flannery & Samolyk (2005), most states have 
usury laws prohibiting the charging of interest at rates this high, which impairs the ability of  
MFIs to generate a profit. Some organizations, such as payday lenders, are able to circumvent 
such statutes, however; the methods they use are probably not available to most MFIs. Payday 
lenders in many states operate according to enabling statutes which are separate from those 
governing banks and other mainstream lenders. Absent enabling statutes, payday stores operate 
as agents for banks located in states with much less restrictive usury limits, such as South Dakota 
or Delaware which impose no interest rate ceiling at all (Flannery, & Samolyk, 2005). In 
contrast, most MFIs in the United States are community based organizations and likely lack ties 
to financial organizations in other states. Also, most MFIs in the U.S. have a mission component 
and attempt to serve low-income and predominantly ethnic minority communities (Pollinger et 
al., 2007). In light of this fact, most MFIs are probably unwilling to charge interest rates 





As can be seen from the preceding discussion, MFIs in the United States have had trouble 
achieving sustainability and some question whether they are even effective at stimulating 
economic activity and helping the poor escape poverty. MFIs cannot charge interest rates high 
enough to cover the costs incurred when making small loans and must depend on subsidies. As 
stated by Pollinger, Outhwaite, and Cordero-Guzman (2007) “If subsidies are required to serve 
the market … it is incumbent on the microfinance industry to demonstrate that theirs is an 
efficient mechanism for delivering such subsidies” (p. 39).  Receiving government or charitable 
funds is never guaranteed, especially in an environment of economic uncertainty which 
continues to pervade the U.S. and world economy. These factors clearly make it very difficult to 
be certain that microfinance is effective in the U.S. context or if it is even sustainable at all. 
Research Questions 
In this thesis, we attempt to answer the following research questions: 
1.) Could a microequity financing model offer a solution to the difficulties that have prevented 
MFIs in the United States from achieving sustainability? 
2.) How would a microequity financing model work in practice? In particular, would it be 
possible to create a “micro” version of traditional methods of equity financing, which have a 
proven track record, such as venture capital and angel investing (“microVCs” or “microangels”)?  
Do the provisions of the recently passed JOBS act facilitate or inhibit such a model? 
 These questions will be answered by conducting a focused literature review. First, the 
literature that highlights the successful practices of international and domestic MFIs will be 
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reviewed. Next, the relevant literature relating to traditional business financing such as loans, 
bonds, stocks, venture capital, angel investing, etc. will be analyzed. Some business models that 
are already in use, which are similar to the microequity concept, will be discussed as well. 
Finally, the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act will be thoroughly examined as they are 














Successes and Best Practices of MFIs 
International Perspective 
 As stated earlier, the international microfinance movement is widely accepted to have 
begun with Grameen Bank in the late 1970’s in Bangladesh. Grameen Bank’s founder, Dr. 
Muhammad Yunus, created a lending model based on the concept of Grameen Credit, which was 
described earlier. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this model is the group lending feature. 
Group lending generally refers to individuals who lack collateral joining together to obtain loans.  
In the classic Grameen model the loans are distributed to individuals, but all in the group face 
consequences if any one member runs into serious repayment difficulties, this is known as joint 
liability. (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005). There are also other forms of group lending known as 
individual liability and village banking. In individual liability, group lending borrowers are not 
directly responsible for other group members’ debt obligations, however; the borrowers come 
together for regular repayment meetings with the representative of the MFI. The loans are repaid 
in public and often the meetings do not end until all loan payments are received (Khavul, 2010). 
In this way the social and moral obligations of group members to repay are retained without 
actually holding members responsible for the debts of others. Village banking has been described 
by Khavul (2010) as “…groups of individuals are jointly given a loan amount that they then 
allocate to their members. Village banks establish leadership roles among members who are 
responsible for managing and the lending activities. Village banking requires that members 
cross-guarantee each other’s loans” (p. 62).   
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Originally the motivation for the group lending model was economies of scale, but MFIs 
soon realized that the model had other important advantages such as reducing the costs of 
screening and monitoring loans and of enforcing debt repayments. These advantages helped to 
alleviate the aforementioned problems that financial institutions have traditionally faced when 
lending to the poor: information asymmetry, multiple sources of  risk, and the high proportion of 
fixed costs on small loans (Khavul, 2010; Armendariz & Morduch, 2005). The way group 
lending obviates these difficulties is by taking advantage of the strong social networks that exist 
in low income communities. The borrowers form the groups without input from the MFI, and 
research has shown that borrowers who are likely to repay will self-select into groups with other 
“good” borrowers, to the exclusions of borrowers who are unlikely to repay, thereby alleviating 
some of the problems in multiple risk sources and information asymmetry. Also, the public 
repayment meetings allow for the fixed costs due to servicing the loans to be spread out amongst 
many groups (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005). 
Because of these advantages, international MFIs have consistently reported very high 
loan repayment rates, despite the fact that no collateral is used for these loans. However, many 
have argued that loan repayment rates are an insufficient measure of the success of MFIs and that 
instead more emphasis should be put on the outcomes for the MFIs’ clients. The question, they 
argue, is whether or not microfinance is working, in other words, is microfinance helping to 
alleviate poverty? The answer to this question is still open to debate and is complicated by the 
fact that it depends on who you ask as there are multiple stakeholders involved in such a 
complex phenomenon. One thing is certain, MFIs in the developing world have proven to be 
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sustainable, with organizations such as Grameen Bank and the Association for Social 
Advancement in Bangladesh having been in existence since the late 1970’s (A Short History of 
Grameen Bank, 2011; About ASA: Origin, 2012), and BancoSol in Bolivia since 1986 
(BancoSol: History, 2012). 
Microfinance in the US 
 Microfinance in the US shares the same goals as microfinance in the developing world, 
helping lower income entrepreneurs to start businesses and escape poverty. However, for a few 
important reasons, MFIs in the US have had less success than their international counterparts in 
achieving sustainability. First, financing entities in developing nations are subject to less 
stringent regulations and are free to charge interest rates sufficient to cover their costs, but in the 
US this is almost always prohibited by statutes (Bell, 2010; Gollakota & Doshi, 2010). Second, 
many studies have shown that the social pressure to repay microloans via the group lending 
practice is ineffective in the US. The reasons for this are: a lower population density compared 
with places like Bangladesh leading to much greater dispersion in potential customers; a much 
more transient and mobile low income population; and the fact that most groups that were 
formed in the US were assigned by the MFIs rather than being formed by the borrowers 
themselves, which negated the advantages of group lending in information asymmetry problems  
(Chandra & Arun, 2011; Gollakota & Doshi, 2010). Finally, one crucially important factor in the 
success of MFIs is that if the businesses started by the loan recipients are successful, then it is 
clearly much more likely that the loans are going to be repaid. But starting a business in a formal 
and developed economy like the United States is much more difficult than in the developing 
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world. For instance, in the US an entrepreneur who is interested in starting a retail store will have 
to compete with giants like Wal-Mart and Target. Also, there are many regulations at the federal, 
state, and local level that must be complied with. These obstacles are more or less nonexistent in 
the developing nations where microfinance has had so much success. Not only does this create 
additional difficulties for the entrepreneur in creating a successful enterprise in the US, but MFIs 
in the US realize that they must provide training and technical assistance to their clients if these 
problems are to be overcome, which adds substantially to the costs of operating for domestic 
MFIs (Chandra & Arun, 2011; Gollakota & Doshi, 2010). 
So, the question is what have MFIs in the US done to cope with the challenges presented 
by these differences in regulation, culture and the economic environment? First, since US MFIs 
are unable or unwilling to charge interest rates high enough to cover their costs, many have been 
very resourceful in finding sources of funding. A major source of funding for MFIs in the US 
comes from banks who frequently partner with MFIs as part of their compliance with the 
Community Reinvestment Act (Chandra & Arun, 2011; Gollakota & Doshi, 2010). Many MFIs 
also receive financial support from the federal government and private philanthropy (Edgcomb & 
Girardo, 2012). Second, because of the decreased effectiveness of the group lending 
methodology in the US, MFIs need to come up with another way to ensure repayment. One 
solution has been to require collateral for providing microloans, although in many cases the full 
value of the loan is not collateralized and the collateral is mostly symbolic (Gollakota & Doshi, 
2010).  Another way that MFIs in the US ensure repayment is also the method they use to 
overcome the more difficult economic environment, and that is by providing business 
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development services.  A survey of microenterprise programs showed that in 2010, 75 percent of 
programs provided a microfinancing product and 97 percent provided some type of business 
development services (The Aspen Institute/FIELD 2012). Many times the entrepreneurs who 
have received microcredit work very closely with the staff of the MFI to receive training, 
mentoring, coaching, and other business development services.  
Since entrepreneurs are somewhat dependent on the MFIs to provide this type of support, 
they typically have a clear incentive not to fall behind on their payments so that they may 
continue to benefit from these services. The practice also benefits the MFIs because they stand a 
much better chance of recovering their investment if they help the microcredit 
recipient/entrepreneur to start and sustain a successful business (Klein & Gomez, 2010).  
However, as stated above, providing such services adds to the costs of the MFI. This may 
necessitate an increased dependence on subsidies, which brings us back to the problem of 
sustainability for US MFIs.  
 
Traditional Business Financing 
Debt Financing 
 Firms generally prefer using debt rather than equity to finance operations because interest 
expense is deductible from the firm’s taxable income. The firm can take advantage of the fact 
that a greater dollar amount can be paid out to both equity and debt security holders when the 
firm uses some percentage of debt in its financing mix, compared to an all-equity capitalization. 
This concept is known as the tax shield on interest. The tax shield on interest is presumed to have 
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value in the marketplace and therefore increases the total value of the firm. However, there 
comes a point where the advantages of the tax shield are offset by the potential costs of firm 
failure. If a firm cannot meet its debt payment obligations it will be forced in to bankruptcy and 
will incur associated penalties (Keown, Martin, Petty, & Scott, 2003; Kraus & Litzenberger, 
2012).  
 For startups and small firms then, the cost of using debt is much higher. As stated by 
Klein, O’Brien, & Peters (2002) “Firms with lower expected cash flows find it more costly to 
incur higher levels of debt (because bankruptcy is more likely) than do firms with higher 
expected cash flows” (p. 321). It is reasonable to assume that startup and small businesses will 
have low expected cash flows during the nascent stage of their life. However, these types of 
firms are forced to rely on bank loans and to operate with higher levels of debt; rather than 
utilizing more appropriate forms of financing, such as equity, because of flotation costs and 
problems of access to capital markets (Akyüz, Akyüz, Serіn, & Cindik, 2006; Marsh, 1982).  
 Many small businesses and startups may even have difficulty accessing debt financing 
because they are not profitable and/or they lack tangible assets (Denis, 2004). One way this 
problem can be overcome is by having small and startup business owners secure debt financing 
via personal credit cards and home equity lines of credit, although these sources of financing 
have been considerably curtailed in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis (Gomez & 
Edgcomb, 2011). Another solution that is not as personally risky to the owners of the firm is to 
rely on an alternative source of equity capital, such as venture capital funds or angel investors.  
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 Also worthy of note is an alternative form of debt financing which has emerged in the 
recent past as a viable option for entrepreneurs, online peer to peer lending platforms. These 
platforms are somewhat analogous to the crowdfunding intermediaries envisioned in the JOBS 
Act which will be discussed later in this paper. These lending platforms operate by facilitating 
loans between borrowers and individual investors. For instance, a borrower may sign up with the 
lending platform, pass through the screening process, and list their loan request on the platforms 
website, including details such as the purpose of the loan and the terms they are willing to 
accept. Then, individual lenders browse the site and can chose to fund loans or portions of loans 
depending on their desire to diversify risk and their risk/return appetite (FDIC, 2009). Although 
these platforms are an attractive alternative source of funding, there are still some problems in 
utilizing these sources of funding for microentrepreneurs. First, the peer to peer lending 
platforms still have a minimum credit score for borrowers that they will accept (Gomez & 
Edgcomb, 2011). However, many times potential microentrepreneurs have either poor credit or 
no credit history at all. Second, these loans are still debt so there is still the difficulty of making 
regular interest payments which can be especially difficult for startup businesses.  
Equity Financing 
 Equity financing involves a capital investment in a company in return for a percentage of 
the ownership of the firm. The most notable example of equity financing is the major public 
stock exchanges and the NASDAQ, where equity securities are sold to the general public. The 
companies selling shares via these platforms tend to be large established corporations. However, 
private equity, where the exchange does not take place in the public market, is a substantial 
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source of equity financing for startups and small businesses. Two sources of private equity 
financing, venture capital and angel investors, are of potential importance to our discussion.  
Venture capital refers to limited partnerships in which the managing partners invest on 
behalf of the limited partners. The limited partners are typically pension funds, endowments, 
foundations, and high net worth individuals; the managing partners are often former successful 
entrepreneurs, businessmen and businesswomen, and other skilled professionals. Together, the 
partners form a venture fund that will invest in companies developing significant innovations at 
the early stages of such companies’ development, or a more traditional business that has the 
potential for tremendous growth. These startups are inherently risky and many of them end up 
failing, but, to offset this possibility, a requirement of the venture capitalist is that the startups 
have a tremendous potential for growth. In return for the considerable risk of providing the 
investment the venture capitalists receive an equity stake in the company, from which they hope 
to earn a substantial profit at an exit event such as an IPO or a sale of the company to a larger 
corporation (National Venture Capital Association, 2011; Denis, 2004).  
 A common sense notion is that venture capitalists will receive very high returns on their 
investment if the companies they invest in succeed, and to that end venture capitalists are 
frequently very active investors. Research has shown that companies that obtain venture capital 
are more likely to professionalize along the dimensions of the recruitment process, the overall 
human resource policies, the hiring of professional sales and marketing staff, and the adoption of 
stock option plans; more likely to replace the founder with an outside CEO and are faster in 
effectuating such changes; and in cases where the founder is not replaced with an outside CEO 
17 
 
the venture capitalists focus on fostering professionalization further down in the organization 
(Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Furthermore, respected venture capitalists can help entrepreneurs to 
raise additional funds by certifying the quality of a startup. Since these activities are costly to 
provide, the implication is that venture capitalists add value to the companies they invest in, 
although there are costs associated with their involvement (Denis, 2004). 
 Angel investors (angels) on the other hand, are high net-worth individuals who also 
provide equity capital to startup businesses. Angels are often times former entrepreneurs, 
industry executives, doctors, lawyers, or other wealthy businessmen. Many times angels will 
qualify as accredited investors as defined in the Securities Act of 1933, which greatly simplifies 
the equity transaction since this status allows the transaction to be exempted from the registration 
requirements of the statute.  Although there are some similarities between venture capitalists and 
angel investors, there are several key differences. One major difference is that angels are 
investing their own money, as opposed to the managing partners of a venture capital firm who 
are investing the funds of the limited partners. Also, angels tend to invest in businesses that are 
too small to attract venture capital funds, frequently businesses that have yet to make any sales. 
In this way angels are complementary to venture capital investors, as they invest in riskier firms 
and in firms that venture capitalists are not interested in as they may not be high growth-potential 
firms, e.g. mainstream businesses such as restaurants, construction companies, daycare centers, 
etc. While angels may provide assistance to the firms they invest in, many are passive. The 
likelihood that angels will provide assistance to the businesses they invest in increases with 
geographic proximity, and many angels only invest in businesses in their local area. Finally, 
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although typical angel investments are smaller than those made by venture capitalists, by most 
estimates angels in aggregate fund a substantially higher number of firms and provide a much 
greater total dollar amount of funding (DeGennaro, 2009; Wong, Bhatia, & Freeman, 2009).  
Summary of Financing Options 
 Although all of these sources of financing are utilized by entrepreneurs, small, startup 
firms face many obstacles in securing needed funds. As has been discussed earlier, it is often 
very difficult for these types of firms to secure debt financing, and if debt financing is obtained it 
can be a considerable burden to the small firm to meet its debt payment obligations. Alleviating 
this difficulty has been the goal of U.S. MFIs, but MFIs have had problems achieving 
sustainability. Many small firms do turn to the alternative equity sources of financing such as 
venture capital and angel investors, but these sources are not perfect either. Venture capitalists 
focus exclusively on high growth-potential firms, leaving out most mainstream businesses. 
Angel investors seem to be more willing to finance mainstream projects, but typically do not 
invest in businesses outside of their local area.  
Crowdfunding 
One potential solution which has been enabled by the advent of the internet age is the 
recent innovation of online crowdfunding. Up until the recent passage of the JOBS Act by the 
U.S. Congress, crowdfunding has been limited to donations or charitable contributions. This is 
because of the prohibition in the Securities Act of 1933 against the use of any means of 
communication in interstate commerce to sell securities if a registration statement has not been 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (U.S. Congress, 1933). This has 
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basically precluded small startups from utilizing crowdfunded equity financing because 
complying with the registration requirement is a complicated process. Any mistakes in the 
registration process could subject a small securities issuer to serious criminal liabilities. 
Therefore, experienced legal counsel has generally been considered the only way to safely 
comply with the registration requirements, and this is an expense that most small startups simply 
cannot afford.   It appears the U.S. Congress was aware of this difficulty, and the JOBS Act has 
added an exemption for certain businesses who comply with its provisions. 
The JOBS Act 
 The JOBS Act of 2012 made many major changes to U.S. Securities law. Of particular 
importance to a microequity model of microfinance is Title III of the act, the portion covering 
the amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 which legalize online equity crowdfunding. 
Section 302 of the JOBS Act sets forth many provisions for securities issuers to comply with in 
order to take advantage of the exemption. In fact, it seems complying with the provisions of the 
JOBS act will not be a simple process at all, although the intent of Congress was that its 
provisions are less onerous than the previous requirements that were in place before the Act’s 
passage. Many of the requirements set forth by Congress in the JOBS Act are general in nature 
and the Act specifically instructs the SEC to promulgate rules stipulating the exact manner in 
which the Act’s provisions are to be complied with. This is clearly a very complex process and 
Congress had given the SEC 270 days from the enactment of the legislation to draft such rules. 
The JOBS Act was enacted on April 5
th
, 2012; therefore the SEC had until December 31
st
, 2012 
to promulgate the final rules and regulations for complying with the provisions of the JOBS Act. 
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However, this deadline was not met. As of the date of this writing, certain aspects of this law, 
which will be discussed in this section, are yet to be official.  
Although I have made every effort to thoroughly analyze the wording of the actual 
document produced by the U.S. Government Printing Office, I am limited by the fact that I am 
not a legal professional and my interpretations of the statue may be different from what the SEC 
ultimately determines. Nonetheless, I believe that I can make a satisfactory analysis of the Act as 
it relates to a microequity model for microfinance. 
 There are actually numerous requirements under Title III of the JOBS Act; to discuss all 
of them would be impractical. I will discuss the aspects that I believe are most relevant to a 
microequity financing model. First is the requirement that all transactions are to take place 
through an intermediary, which may be a broker or an online funding portal (U.S. Congress, 
2012). In the case where the intermediary is an online funding portal, such an intermediary may 
register with the SEC as simply a funding portal which should entail less complexity than 
registering as broker. However, the funding portal may not handle the funds directly and must 
hire a bank or a broker to do so, unless the funding portal registers with the SEC as a broker. 
This requirement could have an impact on a microequity model in that such a funding portal or 
broker will likely require a percentage of the funds raised as a fee, considering the necessity of 
hiring a bank or broker or the costs of registering with the SEC as a broker. It will be necessary 
to ensure that such a fee is not so large that it prevents a useful amount of funds from being 
delivered to the entrepreneur. Luckily, these transactions will take place in the online forum; 
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therefore it is likely that there will be many funding portals competing to offer such services. 
This competition will most likely keep fees at a reasonable level.  
Second, the Act requires that the business issuing securities does not sell more than $1 
million of such securities during a calendar year (U.S. Congress, 2012). This requirement should 
not be an issue for a microequity model as it is intended to focus on small, startup businesses that 
should require much less than $1 million of funding in practice. 
 Third, it is required that the intermediaries ensure that the offering proceeds are only 
provided to the issuer if a target offering amount, predetermined by the issuer, is reached by a 
deadline which is also predetermined by the issuer (U.S. Congress, 2012). This requirement has 
the potential to create some complications for a microequity model, but as long as the 
entrepreneur is realistic about their needs and sets a target offering amount that is attainable, then 
it should be possible to meet the target in many, if not most, instances. Contained in the same 
subsection as the requirement on target offering amounts is a provision requiring an intermediary 
to allow all investors to cancel their commitment to invest, apparently while the process of 
building to the target offering amount is ongoing. This requirement could prove to be a problem 
for a microeqity model or indeed any business attempting to take advantage of the JOBS Act. 
However, the SEC has yet to determine the exact method of enforcing this provision and it is 
possible that they will draft the rules in such a way that these cancellations do not count against 
the target offering amount, or allow the deadline for reaching the target amount to be extended. 
Fourth, issuers are required to provide both the SEC and the funding portal or broker with 
the following information: The name, legal status, address and website of the issuer; the names 
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of the management and each person holding more than twenty percent of the shares of the issuer; 
and a description of the business plan of the issuer (U.S. Congress, 2012). The first two of these 
requirements should not present any problem for a microequity model, however the business 
plan requirement may prove difficult for a microentrepreneur or other aspiring startup business 
owner who may lack any formal business training and might have considerable difficulty 
creating a business plan. This difficulty may be circumvented by reaching out to a local business 
development service, or perhaps intermediaries may offer assistance to issuers with regards to 
this requirement.  
Fifth, as part of the same subsection requiring a business plan, there is a requirement for 
financial statements to be provided, with offerings of increasing target offering amounts 
requiring increasingly complex financial statements (U.S. Congress, 2012). For the purposes of a 
microequity model I will only consider the requirements for an offering of $100,000 or less, 
which include any income tax returns filed by the issuer for the most recently completed year 
and financial statements of the issuer, which must be certified by the principal executive officer 
of the issuer. The income tax return requirement should not prove overly difficult to comply 
with, and the JOBS Act specifically notes that there may be no such income tax return to 
provide. The financial statement requirement may prove difficult on the other hand, in much the 
same way as the business plan requirement, due to the fact that a small business owner may be 
unsure of how to produce financial statements. It seems that technical assistance will be 
necessary in many cases in order for the issuer to comply with this requirement as well. 
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Sixth, again part of the same subsection which requires a business plan and financial 
statements, the issuer is required to provide a description of the ownership and capital structure 
of the issuer which includes among other things: terms of the securities; each class of securities; 
method of valuing the securities now and in the future; risks to an investor from minority 
ownership, corporate actions, sales of the issuer or assets thereof, and transactions with related 
parties; and finally any other information that the SEC determines appropriate (U.S. Congress, 
2012). Again it is clear that this rather complex requirement will be beyond the ability of most 
small business startups to easily comply with, and will probably present considerable difficulty 
to the application of a microequity model. Once again, it seems that technical assistance will 
have to be provided.   
Finally, Section 4A(c) provides the right for securities purchasers to sue the issuer for 
material misstatements or omissions in the offering or sale of the securities (U.S. Congress, 
2012). This section clearly has serious ramifications for a microequity model. For one, many of 
the aforementioned requirements were clearly quite complex. A typical small business owner 
would probably have considerable difficulty complying with these requirements and could make 
a material mistake or omission unintentionally and then be subject to severe civil penalties. This 
might cause potential entrepreneurs to balk at the risk of being sued and facing a judgment that 
could ruin the finances of their fledgling business.  
In sum, the JOBS Act has created a new opportunity for small and startup businesses to 
raise equity funding via crowdfunding online. However, utilizing the Act’s exemptions to the 
U.S. Securities laws requires strict adherence to numerous complex requirements. The only 
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reasonable conclusion is that an attorney who specializes in securities law will have to be 
retained, and it is probable that the assistance of other qualified professionals such as accountants 
will also be necessary to comply with the Act’s provisions. This will add considerable expense 
that a small business startup may not be able to afford. For a microequity model to utilize the 
JOBS Act’s exemptions, it will be necessary to make sure that the assistance of qualified 
professionals is available to the entrepreneur at an affordable rate, in order to guide them through 
the compliance process.   
Findings from Literature 
 MFIs in the U.S. have not fared as well as their international counterparts. Some of the 
major causes of this discrepancy are the fact that MFIs face much more stringent government 
regulations in the U.S. as compared to MFIs in the developing world, the lack of a tight-knit 
social structure among low income entrepreneurs in the U.S., and the difficulties faced by small 
businesses in the U.S. in competing in a complex market. MFIs in the U.S. have tried to 
overcome these difficulties by providing business development services and utilizing sources of 
funding other than interest earned from loans, such as government grants, but the question 
remains whether or not these practices are sustainable. If not, many would be entrepreneurs will 
have few options on financing their small business (microenterprise). 
 Small businesses are virtually shut out of the equity market. Microenterprises typically 
will not be candidates for venture capital financing as very few of them have the potential for 
explosive growth that is a prerequisite for these firms to provide an investment. They also in 
most cases cannot utilize a public equity offering due to the burden of complying with SEC 
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regulations and would be unlikely to be able to attract a qualified investor in order to make use of 
a private equity transaction. Angel investing is a possibility, but many small business owners do 
not know such an individual.   
 Similarly, microenterprises have difficulty obtaining debt financing. Most lack any 
collateral with which to secure a loan. Even if there was sufficient collateral on hand, most 
microenterprises will have periods of very small or even negative cash flows during the early 
stages of their life, or, in some industries, seasonally. Therefore there is a very high risk of 
bankruptcy for those that do make use of debt financing.  
 Microenterprises are clearly starting out with the odds stacked against them. Funding 
options are limited and they face a highly competitive marketplace. Not only do these businesses 
need cash, but they also need help and advice to in order to succeed. Given the high rate of 
institutions that offer business development services, MFIs seem to be the best bet for would be 
microentrepreneurs, yet the U.S. industry has been unable to reach the scale and sustainability of 
its international counterparts. Debt financing is usually difficult to obtain, and there are no 
business development services provided by banks and other institutions offering debt financing. 
Obtaining public equity financing is virtually impossible for microenterprises, and private equity 
is also hard to obtain unless the microentrepreneur knows an angel investor.  
Based on these findings, we have come to the conclusion that there is a real need for a 
new method of providing small amounts of capital to entrepreneurs, microequity, where 
investors can work with the entrepreneurs to help build these startups into successful small 
businesses. We propose models structuring the microequity funding arrangement in a manner 
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similar to traditional private equity vehicles, venture capital firms and angel investors. The 
crowdfunding provisions of the recently passed JOBS Act can be utilized in these models to 
more easily raise funds for these small businesses than previously would have been possible. We 
will also propose a model using franchising and microequity and/or microloans in order to 
expand a small business into a larger network of franchises.  
Microequity Models 
In this section, I propose three models of pursuing a microequtiy based microfinance 
arrangement that may provide solutions to the questions of can a microequity financing model 
offer a solution to the difficulties that have prevented MFIs in the United States from achieving 
sustainability and how a microequity model would work in practice.  
 Straight Microequity  
 In this model, small businesses are funded by investors who take an ownership share in 
the businesses. The arrangement would work in much the same way as the traditional stock 
markets, with investors purchasing shares in the microenterprises in return for a certain equity 
stake. Two possibilities to utilize this model in practice are first; microenterprises could 
independently offer shares in their businesses for sale via an online funding portal as envisioned 
in the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding provisions; and second, MFI’s could structure their 
microenterprise programs as equity rather than debt. I will discuss each of these possibilities in 
turn.  
 If microenterprises offer shares directly to public investors via online funding portals, this 
will undoubtedly increase the funding options for those entrepreneurs starting small businesses, 
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however, this arrangement has several potential drawbacks. First, although it is beneficial for the 
microenterprises to receive the funds from investors, the impersonal and informal nature of the 
online crowdfunding method means that investors and those small businesses receiving the finds 
will have little face to face contact. Therefore, the microentrepreneurs will still have to face the 
considerable challenges of complying with the resgistration requirements of the JOBS Act on 
their own. Also, the microetrepreneur who is likely to be an inexperienced business person will 
have to face the considerable challenges of building, managing, and sustaining a viable and 
profitable business. It is also questionable whether microentrepreneurs taking this route will 
actually be able to convince public investors to invest in their businesses and therefore actually 
be able to raise sufficient funds using this method.  
 The second possibility of MFIs structuring their programs using equity rather than debt 
would seem to offer a more promising avenue for implementing a straight microequity 
arrangement. In this case, a MFI will receive an equity stake in the microenterprise in return for 
its investment which includes funding as well as business management assistance. In effect the 
MFI and microentrepreneur will become partners who will share the risks and rewards of the 
venture. The MFI will have a vested interest in helping the microenterprise succeed and thereby 
ensuring a reasonable return on their investment. Therefore there will be a strong incentive for 
the MFI to work closely with the microentrepreneur to provide business development assistance 
leading to an increased chance of success for the microenterprise.  In such an arrangement the 
equity contract could be structured so that the microetrepreneur pays a specific dividend to the 
MFI on a regular basis, and then at the end of a specific term, there is an agreement for the 
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microentrepreneur to buy back the shares from the MFI. In this way the MFI is earning a return 
via the dividend payments. When the shares are repurchased the MFI is able to reinvest in a new 
microenterprise and start the process over. This type of arrangement has many advantages over 
MFI’s traditional method of financing microenterprises, microcredit. In microcredit, the 
microentrepreneur must make regular interest payments, which can present difficulties since it is 
likely that the fledgling microenterprises will have periods of low or even negative cash flows. In 
contrast, using microequity dividends are paid only when the microenterprises are profitable. 
Also, in microcredit, providers cannot share in any potential upside profits, therefore they are 
only concerned with repayment and will attempt to eliminate any possible loss or risk. This 
means that venture that may be potentially very profitable yet risky will probably be passed over 
by microcredit providers.  
Micro Venture Capital 
 This model for microequity would work in a manner that is very similar to traditional 
venture capital and angel investing. In the case of a micro venture capital (microVC) model, a 
fund will be created for investment in microenterprises. Sources for the fund will be well to do 
individuals who are looking for an investment which provides an acceptable financial return as 
well as providing a social return component. Many investors would like to invest in their local 
communities and small businesses rather than in the traditional financial markets, and a microVC 
find would make this possible. These investors would be fulfilling the role that is played by the 
limited partners in traditional venture capital investing. In the case microVCs, it is possible that 
these same investors could be the active managers of the fund, or alternatively, other experienced 
29 
 
business professionals could take the position of the managing partners who will work closely 
with the microenterprises to provide business support services. In either case, the 
microenterprises are worked with closely by the managers of the fund to be provided with 
coaching and business development assistance. The investments can be structured similarly to 
those described in the straight microequity model above, where there will be regular dividend 
payments made when the microenterprises are profitable with an arrangement for the 
micoentrepreneur to buy the shares back after a certain term. In this way the fund earns an 
acceptable return and when these funds are operating in the local community there is the added 
social benefit for the investors in knowing that they are investing in the success and prosperity of 
their local community. A microVC fund could also take advantage of the crowdfunding 
provisions of the JOBS Act. The fund could be created by soliciting fund investors via an online 
funding portal, although there are some questions as to whether this is compatible with the 
provisions of the Act, namely the financial statement and business plan requirements. However, 
as the fund would be structured as a limited partnership and managed by experienced business 
professionals, these obstacles should be easy to overcome, although this is dependent on the final 
rules which are as yet to have been promulgated by the SEC.  
MicroFranchises 
 Another option of pursuing a microequity model for microfinance is structuring the 
investments as microfranchises. To better illustrate how this model would work in practice, it is 
useful to introduce a small case study of an actual franchisor, Supergalss Windshield Repair. 
Superglass is an international franchisor. As a former employee of the company, I had many 
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personal conversations with the company’s president, David Casey. Superglass Windshield 
Repair is a franchisor based in Orlando, FL, with over 300 franchisees operating nationwide, as 
well as franchises in Canada and South Korea. David A. Casey, president of Superglass, spoke 
with me on numerous occasions regarding the financing Superglass uses to assist their 
franchisees in starting their businesses. A Superglass franchise normally costs $10,000 as a 
franchise fee, and there is a perpetual royalty arrangement of 3-5%. Many franchisees are not 
able to pay $10,000 up front to purchase the business, therefore for a small down payment of 
typically $1000-$2000, Superglass will finance the balance on a credit basis directly to the 
franchisee. An obvious problem is how to ensure the franchisee will repay the balance of the 
franchise fee. As Mr. Casey communicated to me, this is not a problem because the business 
format provided by Superglass includes the right to use Superglass’ proprietary windshield repair 
resin and repair technology. The resin and equipment used by Superglass is superior to what the 
franchisees would be able to procure elsewhere, therefore the franchisees have a strong incentive 
to repay, because if they fail to do so they can be cut off from receiving supplies critical to the 
functioning of their business.  
 It could be possible to generalize a model for microequity, which utilizes the JOBS Act, 
based on the practices of Superglass. A “franchisor”, in this case actually a type of MFI, would 
serve as the incorporated business that sells shares via an online funding portal. The MFI is 
staffed by experienced professionals who are able to ensure compliance with the JOBS Act’s 
provisions.  Once a target offering amount is raised, this is distributed in small portions at the 
discretion of the MFI. The MFI distributes portions of the funds raised to several 
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microentrepreneurs who are pursuing a small, mainstream business in a few selected industries. 
The reason for limiting the small businesses to a few industries is so that the MFI in this model 
can develop business expertise in these fields so that adequate training, coaching, and other 
business development services can be provided to the microentrepreneurs.  
The contract with the microentrepreneurs could utilize a dividend/share buyback 
arrangement similar to the one discussed in the previous models, thereby ensuring the MFI 
receives an acceptable return and can then reinvest the funds in new microenterprises. 
Alternatively, the MFI could structure the arrangement as a lease to own arrangement, where the 
MFI retains total ownership of the business and the microentrepreneur makes regular payments 
towards eventually obtaining outright ownership of the business. The incentive to repay in this 
arrangement is the eventual ownership of the business by the microentrepreneur. In some cases it 
is likely that a substantial amount of equipment, i.e. a vehicle, will be part of a package which is 
provided to the microentrepreneur, this is a further incentive for repayment as this equipment can 
be repossessed in the event of a default. However, it will be necessary to structure flexibility into 
the lease to own agreement to assist the microentrepreneur in the likely event of periods of low 









 Based on the models which have been proposed above, this thesis addressed the questions 
of whether microequity financing models alleviate the limitations of MFIs as well as proposed 
various micro equity financing models. In regards to the question of whether a microequity 
model for microfinance can offer a solution to the difficulties faced by MFIs that operate in the 
U.S., the two main difficulties that are present are the fact that MFIs in the U.S. cannot charge 
interest rates high enough to cover their costs due to government regulations which put a ceiling 
on the rates which can be charged, and that due to this factor, MFIs must depend on government 
and/or charitable funds to cover these costs. However, as mentioned previously, receiving 
government or charitable funds is never guaranteed, especially in times of economic uncertainty.  
 A microequity based model of microfinance would alleviate this problem of an inability 
to cover costs due to interest rate law. The microequity models, which have been proposed, are 
based on a dividend and share buyback model, thereby circumventing interest rate laws since the 
financing arrangement is not a loan. The arrangement is also beneficial for the microentrepreneur 
as there is no pressure to make regular interest payments when the business is not profitable. 
Also in the microequity arrangement, there should not be a need to depend on government or 
charitable funds for two reasons. First, MFIs are in a more tightly coupled relationship with the 
microentrepreneurs and will work much more closely to help the business to be successful as 
they are investors in the business, therefore there should be a much lower rate of MFI clients’ 
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businesses failing. Secondly, MFIs can share in any potential upside profits from those 
businesses that turn out to be enormously successful.  
 Regarding the question of how a microequity model for microfinance would work in 
practice, various models of microequity finance were presented. Three models of microequity 
finance were presented: straight microequity, microVCs and microangels, and microfranchises. 
Each of these models represents a viable microequity option can be put into practice. Obviously, 
these models would need to be implemented in a real world setting to truly test their viability. As 
to the question of whether or not the JOBS Act facilitates or inhibits these models, the tentative 
answer is that the Act does facilitate the implementation of these models. However, as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has still as yet to promulgate the final rules and regulations 
for implementing the Act’s provisions, the question is still open as to whether the specifics of 
these rules will actually be beneficial to such models as have been proposed here.  
 In summary, microequity shows a great promise for finally enabling a sustainable 
microfinance arrangement in the U.S. context. Based on the research and models proposed in this 
paper, notably the recent passage of the JOBS Act and the three models of equity based 
microfinance proposed here, a sustainable method to assist microentrepreneurs in the U.S. in 
developing thriving small businesses is on the horizon. Now it will be up to microfinance 
practitioners and hardworking and resourceful entrepreneurs to make the proposals elucidated in 
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